Between February 22 and May 31, 2019, the IAEA issued compliance reports stating that Iran was well-known under its IAEA agreements on verification and monitoring, heavy water treatment, enrichment and fuel activities, centrifuge research and development, production and inventory. , as well as transparency measures.  In response to the reintroduction of nuclear sanctions by the United States, Iran then reduced its compliance with the JCPOA in five phases: on July 1, 2019, Iran exceeded 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluority; on July 8, 2019, Iran enriched uranium from 3.67% to 4.5%; and on 8 September, Iran announced that its research and development obligations would be completely abolished under the JCPOA. Iran invested in the research and development of centrifuge technologies that do not correspond to the IAEA`s surveillance and security measures, and on 16 November, Iran informed the Agency that its heavy water stockpile had exceeded 130 tonnes.  On 5 January, Iran continued the fifth and final planned withdrawal of its commitments and evaded all agreed limits for centrifuges. Iran has not indicated its intention to pursue a nuclear weapon and has committed to continue its cooperation with the IAEA.  VIENNA – The U.N. nuclear watchdog said Friday that Iran remains on the edge of the 2015 nuclear deal with major powers, despite its stockpiles of low-enriched uranium and heavy water growing. Iran`s nuclear program began in the 1950s, but has progressed only slowly. In 1967, the United States provided the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) with a small 5MWt (TRR) research reactor operating with highly enriched uranium (HEU). In 1973, the Shah unveiled ambitious plans to install 23,000 MWe of nuclear power in Iran by the end of the century, accusing the new Iranian Atomic Energy Agency (AIA) of overseeing the task.  But Iran also said it would continue to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Atomic Energy Agency, and that it would return to the nuclear deal if sanctions against the nuclear deal were lifted, according to the New York Times. Amanine`s March 4 statement is not the first time he has opposed attempts by some nations to lead the Agency`s review work.
« If you try to micro-manage or put pressure on the Agency during nuclear verification, it is counterproductive and extremely damaging, » he said, adding that « independent, impartial and factual security measures are essential to preserve our credibility. » To allay fears, Iran could create and operate a secret enrichment facility similar to that of Natanz or Fordow, the agreement allows inspections of the entire fuel cycle; for up to 25 years in some establishments.